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1. Introduction
The Chinese banking sector has traditionally been considered by the authorities as a substitute for
state ﬁnancing in order to ensure continued funding to preserve jobs in its many inefﬁcient but
massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This structure, inherited from the socialist planned economy,
has deprived emerging private enterprises from access to external funding. During the mid-1990s,
Chinese authorities took the step of reforming the ﬁnancial system through recapitalization and the
transfer of non-performing loans (NPL) to asset management companies. These reforms were made
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necessary by China’sWTO commitments to ending restrictions in the banking sector. The ability of the
Chinese ﬁnancial system to allocate capital more efﬁciently and to guarantee non-distortionary
ﬁnancial access to all companies, including private ﬁrms, is therefore a key indicator of the success of
the ongoing reforms.
This issue is especially important as access to external ﬁnance is a crucial determinant of business
expansion.1 Businesses will invest in projects where the expected beneﬁts exceed the costs. Efﬁcient
investment, however, only results when businesses do not face credit constraints which are unrelated
to their own performance. Indeed, a great deal of research has underlined the importance of well-
developed ﬁnancial markets for economic growth.2
Relatively few ﬁrms have access to formal ﬁnance in China (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2003),
despite the country having a very large and deep pool of ﬁnancial capital—an estimated US$4.5 trillion
of assets. Based on the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the investment climate,
conducted in 80 countries over 1999–2000, 80% of private ﬁrms in China cite ﬁnancing constraints as a
major obstacle.3 This ﬁgure, which is twice the median ﬁgure over the whole sample (38.5%), ranks
China as the most ﬁnancially constrained country in the sample, beating Haiti (74.4%) and the Kyrgyz
Republic (66.7%).
Approximately one-quarter of the 2400 ﬁrms interviewed in the World Bank investment climate
survey (2003)4 reply ‘‘No’’ to the question ‘‘Do you have a loan from a bank or ﬁnancial institution?’’,
and on average only about 25% of ﬁrms’ working capital comes from bank loans. Boyreau-Debray and
Wei (2005) analyze the main pitfalls of the Chinese state-dominated ﬁnancial system, and ﬁnd low
capital mobility within China due to local government interference and the mis-allocation of capital.
Such distortions may force private Chinese ﬁrms to look for foreign investors (Huang, 2003). By
establishing cross-border relationships with foreign ﬁrms, private domestic ﬁrms can bypass both the
ﬁnancial and legal obstacles that they face athome. ForeignDirect Investment (FDI) can in fact be seen as
a form of equity ﬁnancing (Harrison et al., 2004). Moreover, from the very beginning of the economic
reforms inChina, foreign-ﬁnancedﬁrmswere granted legal status superior to that of other privateﬁrms.
It is therefore possible that, in the Chinese case, FDI provides capital to ﬁrmswhich would otherwise be
constrained in their growth by their inability to obtain funds, due to distortions in the banking sector.
In this paper,weestimatea structuralmodelbasedon theEuler equation for investment to investigate
the extent towhich ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained andwhether incoming foreign investment in China
alleviates these constraints.We rely on ﬁrm-level data on Chinese companies provided by the Enterprise
Analysis unit of theWorld Bank (World Bank, 2003)5 over the period 1999–2002. We test the following
hypotheses: (1) domestic ﬁrms face different credit constraints depending on their size and private or
state-owned status; and (2) direct foreign investment affects the credit constraints faced by domestic
ﬁrms. Following Harrison and McMillan (2003), we modify the standard Euler investment model by
introducing a borrowing constraint, and then use two measures of ﬁnancial distress, the debt-to-asset
and interest coverage ratios, as proxies for the shadow value of the constraint. In the absence of
constraints, these ﬁnancial variables should play no role in determining future investment.
The results suggest that only domestic private ﬁrms face credit constraints in China.Whenwe split
domestic ﬁrms into public (state-owned) and private ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that public ﬁrms’ investment
decisions are insensitive to debt ratios and the cost of debt. Nor is there any evidence that public ﬁrms
are affected by the presence of foreign ﬁrms. We interpret this as evidence consistent with the notion
of a soft budget constraint for public ﬁrms (Qian and Roland, 1998). In contrast, private domestic ﬁrms
seemmore credit constrained than state-owned or foreign ﬁrms but their ﬁnancing constraints soften
in a context of abundant foreign investment.
1 Surveys suggest that ﬁnancial constraints are a far greater deterrent to investment in developing countries than in
developed countries. Developing-country ﬁrms often cite ﬁnancing constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment
and business expansion (Harvard Institute for International Development and World Economic Forum, 1998).
2 See Caprio and Honohan (2001) for an extensive summary.
3 The ﬁgure computed by Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) excludes ﬁrms with state or foreign ownership since they probably
enjoy preferential access to ﬁnance.
4 Enterprise surveys data can be accessed at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
5 The Enterprise Analysis unit provides Enterprise survey data on the investment climate in 94 countries, based on surveys of
over 60 000 ﬁrms.
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Our contribution is twofold. First, we shed light on the impact of the ongoing reforms of the
ﬁnancial sector by using a structural model to assess the importance of credit constraints in China. In
doing so, we provide an additional test of the approach used by Fazzari et al. (1988) to identify credit
constraints. Second, we focus on the part played by FDI in funding the Chinese corporate sector. More
precisely, we ask whether FDI eases or exacerbates domestic ﬁrms’ credit constraints, and, more
crucially, which types of ﬁrms beneﬁt more from capital inﬂows.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the speciﬁc context of China’s ﬁnancial and
corporate sector and reviews the literature on ﬁnancing constraints. Section 3 presents the structural
model of ﬁrm investment used to estimate the impact of direct foreign investment on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
constraints, and Section 4 presents the ﬁrm-level data used in our empirical work. Section 5 discusses
the empirical results and undertakes several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review on ﬁnancial constraints
This paper builds on two existing lines of research: (1) the analysis of ﬁrmﬁnancing constraints and
their determinants; and (2) work on distortions in China’s ﬁnancial system.
We build on a number of recent studies that have similarly considered the impact of Foreign Direct
Investment on credit constraints. Our paper is closely related to work by Harrison and McMillan
(2003)6 and Harrison et al. (2004),7 who analyze the relationship between ﬁnancial development and
ﬁnancing constraints by estimating Euler equations using micro-data.
This paper also provides an additional test of the approach used in the body of literature pioneered
by Fazzari et al. (1988) to identify credit constraints based on their impact on investment behavior.
2.1. Financing constraints in China
One of the striking features of the Chinese ﬁnancial system is the poor allocation of capital, partly
due to government distortion of the ﬁnancial system to achieve social ends, speciﬁcally to ensure a
continued ﬂow of funding to its many inefﬁcient but massive state-owned enterprises in order to
preserve jobs. This policy has unfortunate consequences: wasteful investments yielding negligible
returns, restrictive funding for the private companies that drive growth, pervasive state ownership of
ﬁnancial institutions which stiﬂes competition and lowers efﬁciency, a feeble array of ﬁnancial
products for consumers, and, as already noted, minimal growth in corporate bond markets.
Despite the very large and deep pool of ﬁnancial capital, the majority of lending goes to less
efﬁcient state-owned enterprises, leaving healthy private enterprises without access to external
funding. As shown by Dollar andWei (2007), this also leads to systematic dispersion in the returns to
capital across locations and sectors.8
Up until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs, i.e., the Bank of China, China
Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China)
were instructed to lend to state-owned enterprises. The Chinese state enterprises submitted
investment plans and funding requests that had to be approved at the provincial and central authority
level. Based on this, lending quotaswere issued to enterprises. Since private enterpriseswere excluded
from submitting investment plans, they were, naturally, also excluded from lending quotas. In
addition, there was a legal bias against private domestic ﬁrms, which made it harder for them to
collateralize their assets in order to obtain loans, and made it riskier for banks to lend them money
(Huang, 2003). While China’s private companies now produce more than half of its GDP, they only
receive 27% of loans and are excluded from the country’s nascent equity and corporate bond markets
(Farrell and Lund, 2006).
6 The authors combine a cross-country ﬁrm-level panel for 38 countries with time-series data on restrictions on international
transactions and capital ﬂows, and ﬁnd that different measures of global ﬂows are associated with a reduction in ﬁrm-level
ﬁnancing constraints.
7 Using ﬁrm-level data from the Ivory Coast over the period 1974–1987, the paper ﬁnds that domestic ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
more credit-constrained than foreign ﬁrms, and that borrowing by foreign ﬁrms aggravates domestic ﬁrms’ credit constraints.
8 Bai et al. (2006) somewhat moderate this conclusion. They also ﬁnd evidence of dispersion in the rate of return to capital,
but their calculations suggest that this has fallen since the end of the 1970s.
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The system was liberalized at the end of the 1990s, when the Chinese constitution acknowledged
the private sector to be an integral part of the economy. Theoretically, lending quotas no longer exist.
However, in practice, banks still consider private enterprises to be riskier than their public peers,
either due to their short credit history or smaller chance of being bailed out by the government.
Moreover, as discussed in Park and Sehrt (2001), lending by state banks is still determined by policy
prerogatives rather than commercial motives.
In summary, a major problem in China’s corporate sector is a political pecking order of ﬁrms which
leads to the allocation of China’s ﬁnancial resources to the least efﬁcient ﬁrms (state-owned
enterprises), while denying the same resources to China’s most efﬁcient ﬁrms (private enterprises).
Even though they are the engine of growth in the Chinese economy,9 private ﬁrms are discriminated
against in terms of access to external funding, protection of property rights, taxation, and market
opportunities. Such distortions may force private Chinese ﬁrms to look for foreign investors (Huang,
2003). By establishing cross-border relationships with foreign ﬁrms, private domestic ﬁrms can
bypass both the ﬁnancial and legal obstacles that they face at home. FDI can in fact be seen as a form of
equity ﬁnancing (Harrison et al., 2004). Moreover, from the very beginning of the economic reforms in
China, foreign-ﬁnanced ﬁrmswere accorded a superior legal status to other private ﬁrms. China is now
among the top FDI recipients in the world (Prasad and Wei, 2005).
Guariglia and Poncet (2008) provide primary empirical conﬁrmation that FDI is used to alleviate
the costs associated with the inefﬁcient banking sector. They study the relationship between ﬁnance
and economic growth using data for 30 Chinese provinces and awide range of ﬁnancial indicators over
the period 1989–2003. They ﬁnd that the negative impact of ﬁnancial distortions on economic growth
is weaker for high FDI recipients. These results indicate that, in the Chinese case, FDI provides capital
to ﬁrms which would otherwise be constrained in their growth by their inability to obtain funds, due
to distortions in the banking sector.
The objective of this paper is to rely on ﬁrm-level data to understand how exactly fast-growing
private Chinese ﬁrms ﬁnance themselves and to check whether private ﬁrms, which are generally
discriminated against by the local ﬁnancial system, have been able to use foreign joint-ventures as a
way of acquiring the capital necessary for investment.
2.2. Testing for ﬁnancing constraints: the literature
The central idea of the literature on ﬁnancing constraints is that investment should not be
determined by a ﬁrm’s net worth or internal funds but only by the ﬁrm’s expected future proﬁtability.
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) indeed suggests that in perfect capital and credit
markets the investment behavior of a ﬁrm is irrelevant for its ﬁnancing decisions and vice-versa.
However, in the presence of market imperfections, ﬁnancing constraints will be reﬂected in ﬁrms’
investment decisions. Empirically, ﬁnancing constraints could be identiﬁed via the sensitivity of
investment to internal funds.10 Work here typically computes the correlation between investment
and measures of internal (cash ﬂow) or external (debt) funds, after controlling for other factors, to
identify credit constraints. Signiﬁcant correlations are usually attributed to capital market
imperfections and therefore suggest the presence of ﬁnancing constraints.11
Following Fazzari et al. (1988), it is typically assumed that there are cross-sectional differences in
the effect of internal funds on ﬁrms’ investment, so that the investment equation should hold across
adjacent periods for a priori unconstrained ﬁrms but not for constrained ﬁrms. This has led to different
a priori classiﬁcations of ﬁrms which attempt to distinguish ﬁnancially constrained from
9 Allen et al. (2005) show that the private sector in China dominates the state and listed sectors, both in terms of output size
and growth trend. Speciﬁcally, they show that between 1996 and 2002, the private sector grew at an annual rate of 14.3%, while
the combined state and listed sector only grew at 5.4%. Using ﬁrm-level data over the 2002–2004 period, Dollar andWei (2007)
report that domestic private ﬁrms have higher (marginal and average) returns to capital than state-owned ﬁrms, with ﬁgures of
151 and 99%, respectively.
10 This literature relies on the assumption that external ﬁnance is more costly than internal ﬁnance due to asymmetric
information and agency problems, and that the ‘‘premium’’ on external ﬁnance is an inverse function of the borrower’s net
worth.
11 See the surveys by Schiantarelli (1995), Blundell et al. (1996), Hubbard (1998) and Claessens and Tzioumis (2006).
J. He´ricourt, S. Poncet / Economic Systems 33 (2009) 1–214
unconstrained ﬁrms. Previous research has typically focused on ﬁrm characteristics that are
associated with information costs as a proxy for credit constraints. Financially constrained ﬁrms are
often thought to be younger, smaller, more indebted and to not pay dividends.12
Empirical tests are then used to determine whether these ﬁrms exhibit stronger correlations
between either investment and cash ﬂow (Fazzari et al., 1988), or investment and debt-to-asset ratios
and interest coverage (Whited, 1992). The intuition is that a stronger investment-cash ﬂow or
investment-debt relationship reﬂects more prevalent ﬁnancing constraints. Most work on ﬁnancing
constraints following on from Fazzari et al. (1988) has used the Q-theory of investment suggested by
Tobin (1969) and Euler equations to study ﬁnancing constraints. Both the Q-theory and Euler models
of investment result from the same optimization problem.13
A number of recent papers have called into question the validity of using investment-cash ﬂow
correlations as proxies for ﬁnancing constraints. Based on statements contained in annual reports,
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that ﬁrms identiﬁed in Fazzari et al. (1988) as ﬁnancially constrained
are in fact not constrained.14 However, many authors still support the use of investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivity as an indicator of credit constraints (Fazzari et al., 2000; Allayannis and Muzomdar, 2004;
Chirinko and von Kalckreuth, 2003) while others are more doubtful (Gomes, 2001; Moyen, 2002; Alti,
2003).15 As explained by Harrison et al. (2004), most papers which question this methodology relate
more directly to theQ-model of investment16 rather than the Euler equationmodel17 (although some of
the criticisms apply to bothmodels). In addition, none of the recent theoretical models questioning this
methodology were derived in a dynamic multi-period setting with investment adjustment costs (see
Bond et al., 2003). While it is true that no theoretical consensus has been reached and that the
relationship between investment and cash ﬂow sensitivities continues to be an important empirical
question, numerous recent results and survey evidence support the intuition that investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivities are indeeda reﬂectionof the extent ofﬁnancing constraints (Love, 2003;Beck et al., 2005).18
3. Theoretical framework
The dynamic model of ﬁrm-value optimization we rely on is similar to those used in the work
previously mentioned in Section 2, and closely follows the speciﬁcation in Harrison and McMillan
(2003), which has the advantage of explicitly including credit constraints.19
12 Several a priori criteria have been used: dividend policy (Fazzari et al., 1988), bond rating (Whited, 1992), age (Devereux and
Schiantarelli, 1990) and ﬁrm size (Audretsch and Elston, 2002). However, the empirical application of one single criterion for
classifying ﬁrms can be overly simplistic since ﬁnancing constraints depend onmany ﬁrm characteristics such as size, age, legal
form and indebtness (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
13 Euler equations for investment have been estimated by numerous authors, with most work concentrating on US ﬁrms. See
Whited (1992), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard et al. (1995), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1995), among others. The
scarcer work using international data includes Bond and Meghir (1994) for the UK, Jaramillo et al. (1996) for Ecuador, Harris
et al. (1994) for Indonesia, Gelos and Werner (1999) for Mexico, Bigsten et al. (2000) for African countries, Patillo (2000) for
Ghana, and Harrison and McMillan (2003) for the Ivory Coast.
14 Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) results have themselves in turn been criticized (Fazzari et al., 2000).
15 Alti (2003) and Gomes (2001) ﬁnd that investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities can be positive even in the absence of ﬁnancial
frictions.
16 Hayashi (1982) argues that average Q may be an imprecise proxy for the unobservable marginal Q. In this case, internal
funds could be a proxy for the proﬁtability of investment and the positive relationship cannot solely be interpreted as capital
and credit market imperfections but rather as ﬁrms with better liquidity also attaining superior investment possibilities (Hoshi
et al., 1991; Schiantarelli, 1996).
17 The Euler equation uses a structural model to capture the inﬂuence of current expectations of future proﬁtability on current
investment decisions. Unlike the Q-model, the Euler-equation approach measures how internal funds indirectly affect
investment via a Lagrange multiplier and does not use the market value of Q. The advantage of this approach is that future
proﬁtability, i.e., marginal Q, does not need to be speciﬁed or observed.
18 Love (2003) ﬁnds that ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed countries have higher investment-cash ﬂow elasticities, especially
small ﬁrms. Survey evidence (see for example, Beck et al., 2000) conﬁrms that ﬁrms in countries with lower levels of ﬁnancial
development are more ﬁnancially constrained, especially small ﬁrms.
19 The primary advantage of explicitly introducing a borrowing constraint in the framework is that it is no longer necessary to
reject the model in order to ﬁnd evidence of credit constraints, nor is it necessary to assume that rejection of the model implies
the presence of credit constraints. The other advantage is that since the coefﬁcient on cash ﬂow is no longer the critical variable
of interest for identifying credit constraints, the possibility that cash ﬂow proxies for unobserved proﬁt opportunities no longer
poses a critical estimation problem (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).
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Weadopt the Euler equationmethodology used in recent contributions to the ﬁnancing constraints
literature (see footnote 11), which relies on less restrictive assumptions than Tobin’s Q.20
Using this framework, we focus on two basic questions: (1) are ﬁrms in China credit constrained?
And (2), how does Foreign Direct Investment affect the credit constraints of domestic ﬁrms? As in
Harrison and McMillan (2003), both hypotheses can be nested in the same general speciﬁcation. To
test for the presence of credit constraints, we proxy for the shadow value of the borrowing constraint
using two ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial distress, the debt-to-assets ratio (DAR) and the interest
coverage ratio (COV). The basic idea is that, in the context of the Euler equation, these indicators of
ﬁnancial distress should have no impact on future investment in a world of perfect information. If,
however, there are information asymmetries which restrict borrowing, then ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially
distressed today will be forced to substitute investment tomorrow for investment today. Hence, the
model predicts a positive relationship between the shadow value of the constraint and future
investment. To test for a differential impact of ownership, we estimate the model separately for
private and for state-owned ﬁrms. Finally, to test for the possibility of crowding out by FDI, we include
a variable that measures the overall level of foreign borrowing by city and industry, and another that
measures the overall level of foreign sales by city and industry. Bothmeasures are interacted with our
proxies for borrowing constraints.
3.1. The model
We estimate a version of the Euler equation, combining insights from Whited (1992), Bond and
Meghir (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Love (2000) and Harrison andMcMillan (2003). The
model exploits the relationship between investments in successive time periods, derived from
dynamic optimization in the presence of symmetric, quadratic costs of adjustment. In this model, a
ﬁrm is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of current and future net cash ﬂows. Firm i
borrows an amount Bit at time t. Credit constraints are modeled as either a non-negative dividend
constraint or a ceiling on borrowing.
The Euler equation characterizing the optimal investment path relates the marginal adjustment
costs in adjacent periods. The constrained ﬁrm behaves as if it had a higher discount rate for a given
level of today’s adjustment costs. Ceteris paribus, constrained ﬁrms will then substitute investment
tomorrow for investment today.
As shown by Harrison and McMillan (2003), the present value of the marginal adjustment cost of
investing tomorrow is given by
ð1 dÞbttþ1E ð1Vi;tÞ
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where bttþ1 is the nominal discount factor between periods t and t + 1, d denotes the depreciation rate
and Et(.) is the expectations operator conditional on information available in period t. The major
challenge is to ﬁnd empirical proxies for the derivatives of net revenue Rwith respect to investment I
and capital K, as well as for Vi,t, the shadow value of the ﬁnancial constraint. We follow Bond and
Meghir (1994), who show that the derivatives of net revenue with respect to I and K can be written as
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where net output Y is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in capital K and labor L, pIi;t is the price of
the investment good, and pi,t is the price of output.
20 As explained in the previous section, numerous recent papers have highlighted other problems with the Q-methodology,
such as severe measurement error and identiﬁcation issues (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Erikson and Whited, 2000; Bond
and Cummins, 2001).
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If we assume that there are no credit constraints (Vi,t = 0), then combining (2) and (3) above,
and adding the subscripts c and k to denote city and industry, yields the following estimating
equation:
I
K
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i;ck;tþ1
¼ b1
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K
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 b2
I
K
2
 !
i;ck;t
þ b3
Y
K
 
i;ck;t
 b4
CF
K
 
i;ck;t
þ b5Ui;ck;t þ hck þ lt
þ ei;ck;tþ1 (4)
where CFi;ck;t ¼ pi;ck;tFðKi;ck;t; Li;ck;tÞ  pi;ck;tGðIi;ck;t;Ki;ck;tÞ wi;ck;tLi;ck;t , with F(K,L) being the production
function gross of adjustment costs and G(I,K) the adjustment cost function.
In the above equation, I denotes gross investment in ﬁxed assets, K denotes the capital stock at
the beginning of the period, CF stands for cash ﬂow, Y = F  G is net output, and Ui,ck,t is the real
user cost of capital. The subscripts i, c, k and t denote the ﬁrm, city, industry and time period,
respectively; hck and lt, respectively, capture the city–industry and time-speciﬁc effects, and ei,ck,t
is the error term.
Eq. (4) underscores that expected future investment (proxied by actual future investment) is
positively related to current investment and negatively related to the square of current investment.
Future investment is negatively related to current cash ﬂow21 and positively related to the user cost of
capital Ui,ck,t, which is a function of the interest rate and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc depreciation rate, and to
current Y/K.
3.2. Testing for credit constraints using the Euler speciﬁcation
We follow Harrison and McMillan (2003) and modify Eq. (4) to test for credit constraints. We put
Vi,t on the right-hand side of Eq. (4) by linearizing (using a Taylor expansion) the product of (1 Vi,t)
and the following period’s derivative of net revenue with respect to investment.22
We proxy empirically for Vi,t, the shadow value of the ﬁnancial constraint, via a ﬁrm-level
measure of ﬁnancial distress. We rely on two such indicators: the ratio of total debt-to-assets
(DAR) and a measure of interest coverage (COV), deﬁned as interest payments divided by debt.23 In
the absence of credit constraints, these measures should have no impact on investment which will
only depend on the associated expected future proﬁtability. If, however, there are information
asymmetries which restrict borrowing, then ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially distressed today will be
forced to substitute investment tomorrow for investment today. Hence, these two measures will
be positively correlated with future investment. Firms that are ﬁnancially distressed are more
likely to be up against their borrowing constraints and are hence more likely to postpone
investment.
To test for different ownership effects, we split our sample between private and state-owned
companies. Finally, to see whether FDI alleviates ﬁnancial constraints, we include a variable
measuring the importance of foreign investment by city and industry, both as a main effect and
interacted with our proxies for credit constraints:
I
K
 
i;ck;tþ1
¼ b1
I
K
 
i;ck;t
 b2
I
K
2
 !
i;ck;t
þ b3
Y
K
 
i;ck;t
 b4
CF
K
 
i;ck;t
þ b5Ui;ck;t þ b6Vi;ck;t
þ b7FDIck;t þ b8Vi;ck;t  FDIck;t þ hck þ lt þ ei;ck;tþ1 (5)
21 Harrison and McMillan (2003) explain the negative relationship between current cash ﬂow and future investment as
follows. A high level of current cash ﬂow implies lower net marginal adjustment costs today. Because, in equilibrium, expected
marginal adjustment costs are equated across periods, this implies lower expected marginal adjustment costs and hence lower
expected investment tomorrow.
22 See Harrison and McMillan (2003) for details.
23 Our empirical estimation also includes a proxy for the real user cost of capital (see infra) which gives another indication of
the degree of ﬁnancial distress faced by the ﬁrm. Most of our results support a positive and signiﬁcant impact of capital cost on
future investment, consistently with our expectations.
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Therefore, Eq. (5) is estimated separately for private24 and for state-owned25 ﬁrms. Firms with
average private ownership greater than 49% over the sample period are considered as private,
otherwise they are state-owned. A dummy variable hck is also included to control for unobservable
ﬁxed characteristics by city (c) and industry (k). Last, we also control for year speciﬁc dummies
(lt).
4. Data and indicators
We use ﬁrm-level data from the World Bank’s 2003 Investment Climate Survey.26 This survey
was run in collaboration with the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and is part of a larger
World Bank project studying the business environment at the ﬁrm level in Africa, Latin America,
and South and East Asia in 2003. A total of 2400 ﬁrms were interviewed in 18 Chinese cities in 15
provinces: Dalian, Benxi (Liaoning), Changchun (Jilin), Haerbin (Heilongjiang), Hangzhou,
Wenzhou (Fujian), Nanchang (Jiangxi), Zhengzhou (Henan), Wuhan (Hubei), Changsha (Hunan),
Shenzhen, Jiangmen (Guangdong), Nanning (Guangxi), Chongqing (Chongqing), Guiyang
(Guizhou), Kunming (Yunnan), Xian (Shaanxi), and Lanzhou (Gansu). The interviews were carried
out by members of the Enterprise Survey Organization of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
The survey unit is the main production facility of the ﬁrm. The data include accounting
information on sales, inputs, labor, capital stock, investment and several other expenditures;
broader information is also included, such as ownership structure, labor force characteristics,
relations with competitors, clients and suppliers, innovation, and market environment and
investment climate.
Around 1800 of these ﬁrms correspond to 14 different 3- and 4-digit level industries in the
manufacturing sector,27 while the other 600 are in services.28 The 14 industries were selected non-
randomly in order to focus on the main sectors in China, and on those sectors with high growth and
innovation rates. Within these groups, ﬁrms were chosen randomly and are therefore representative
of the population.
Firms were interviewed only once in 2003 but were asked to provide information for each year
between 1999 and 2002. As a result some indicators (such as sales, proﬁts and investment) are
available annually, while others (such as the ownership structure) are measured only once over the
whole 3-year period. We focus on the section ‘‘Questions for the Firm’s Accountant and/or Personnel
Manager’’. These latter include all the information related to ownership, ﬁnances and accounting. The
accounting information on sales and input use is annual. Here the data has the structure of a 3-year
panel with no ﬁrm entry or exit. The questions regarding ﬁnance and accounting (investment, cash
ﬂows, liabilities) are answered annually.
We therefore have a maximum of 9600 observations (2400 per year). From the 2400 ﬁrms, we
restrict our attention to the 2198 that are considered to be domestic.29We further eliminate ﬁrms that
are undergoing restructuring and/or bankruptcy by including ﬁrms with positive values of total sales
and total assets (Cleary, 1999). For consistency, we also decided to restrict our sample to ﬁrms
reporting positive debt, interest payments and investment. This leaves us with 5684 usable
observations (around 1300 ﬁrms over 3 years), of which 75% come from private ﬁrms.
Eq. (5) is estimated over the 2000–2002 period (missing values for a number of key variables prevent
us from using information from 1999). The main ﬁrm-level variables are investment, sales, proﬁts,
interest payments, borrowing, ownership shares and cash ﬂows, all scaled by beginning-of-period
24 As measured in the World Bank survey. Private owners include domestic top managers or family, other domestic
individuals, domestic institutional investors, domestic ﬁrms, and domestic banks.
25 As measured in the World Bank survey. Public owners include the national government, state/provincial governments,
local/municipal governments, and other governments, including co-operatives and collective enterprises.
26 Enterprise survey data can be accessed at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
27 These include garment and leather products, electronic equipment, electronic part-making, household electronics, auto and
auto-parts, information technology, food processing, chemical products andmedicine, biotech products and Chinese medicine,
metallurgical products (manufacturing and tools), and transportation equipment (incl. telecommunications and ship-building).
28 Services include accounting and non-banking ﬁnancial services, advertising and marketing, and business services.
29 We deﬁne a ﬁrm as foreign when foreign participation in its capital is at least 49%; it is otherwise deﬁned as domestic.
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capital forconsistency.Wecomplement theﬁrm-leveldatawithcity-and industry-leveldataon foreign-
ﬁrm presence computed as the aggregate of ﬁrm-level information.30
Following Whited (1992) and Harrison and McMillan (2003), DAR is computed as the ratio of the
market value of the ﬁrm’s debt to the value of the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed assets. It can therefore be interpreted as
both a measure of the ﬁrm’s lack of collateral and a measure of the ﬁrm’s current demand for
borrowing relative to its capacity to borrow. The other indicator of ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial distress used to
proxy for the shadow value of the constraint is the interest coverage ratio, COV, deﬁned as the ratio of
the ﬁrm’s interest payments to the sum of the ﬁrm’s interest payments plus cash ﬂow. A higher value
of COVmeans that the ﬁrm expends a larger part of its resources on debt service, and is thus likely to be
closer to its debt capacity.
The real user cost of capital, U, is typically unobservable. The survey does, however, report the
approximate annual rate of interest for the ﬁrm’s most recent loan or overdraft.31 This approach thus
provides us with a fourth indicator (in addition to COV, DAR and CF/K) to assess ﬁrms’ credit
constraints.
The lack of this kind of data is certainly a limitation in the related work of Bond andMeghir (1994)
and Harrison and McMillan (2003), who use ﬁrm dummies to proxy for the user cost of capital. The
introduction of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects32 would arguably help to capture unobserved ﬁrm factors. It would
also control for the possibility of a correlation between a time-invariant component of the error and
the regressors which would make the pooled OLS estimation inconsistent.
However, in our case, data limitations (data is reported for only 3 years) prevent us from controlling
for ﬁrmﬁxed effects. Since ourmodel includes the lagged dependent variable, our estimations are only
run for 2 years (2001 and 2002) of our explained variable. While theoretically only 2 years of data is
needed to use ﬁxed effects, we want to emphasize that our dataset is lacking a crucial feature, that is,
time heterogeneity. The 2 years we have are consecutive and most of our variables do not vary a lot
over time. First differencing could have been an option, had we had 2 years of observations several
years apart. However, that is not without problems either, as it may exacerbate potential problems
with noise or measurement errors in the data (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Again, in our case, the
lack of time-variance precludes us from adopting this approach. There is not much heterogeneity left
in our data.33
Moreover, even if ﬁrm dummies were introduced, we would be confronted with the classical issue
of correlation of lagged dependent variable with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and our limited time coverage
would not allow us to use the usually warranted Arellano-Bond estimations. Our estimations
nevertheless include dummies to account for city–industry time-invariant speciﬁcities.
Our main foreign investment variable is the importance of foreign capital, which we scale by sales
(SALES) or alternatively by debt (DEBT).We thereforemeasure the importance of foreign investment at
the city and industry level as
FDIck;t ¼
Si SALESi;ck;t  FDI Firmi;ck;t
Si SALESi;ck;t
(6)
FDIck;t ¼
Si DEBTi;ck;t  FDI Firmi;ck;t
Si DEBTi;ck;t
(7)
with FDI_Firmi,ck,t being the share of foreign-equity participation at the plant level, which varies
between 0 and 100%. In a regression with city–industry dummies, the impact of foreign investor
presence will be identiﬁed through its time dimension.
30 Indicators of foreign presence at the city and industry level are calculated so as to include all the ﬁrms in the same city and
industry. We checked that the results regarding ﬁnancing constraints of ﬁrm i remain unchanged when foreign presence is
calculated excluding the foreign presence in ﬁrm i itself.
31 When the information for a speciﬁc ﬁrm is missing, we use the average value computed for responding ﬁrms in the same
city and industry instead.
32 The ﬁxed effects estimator is often preferred in the literature to the random effects estimator. Indeed the extra
orthogonality condition used in the random effects estimator – namely, the assumption that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept is
exogenous – is considered dubious.
33 We did perform estimates relying on ﬁrst differencing; as expected, the signiﬁcance of most coefﬁcients disappeared,
measurement error being the likely culprit.
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Table A1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics. Since we want to compare the ﬁnancial
constraints of private and public ﬁrms, we divide the full sample according to ownership. The 49% cut-
off used to differentiate between public and private ﬁrms, as well as to deﬁne domestic ﬁrms, appears
to be appropriate since in our data only a small proportion of ﬁrms have in fact a mixed ownership
structure. Themajority of ﬁrms report being almost fully state-owned or fully privately owned. In fact,
88% of ﬁrms deﬁned as domestic state-owned in our sample have 100% state ownership. The average
public share for those ﬁrms is 96.7% while the average foreign share is below 1%. The situation is very
similar for the sub-sample of ﬁrms deﬁned as private: 96% of the ﬁrms deﬁned as domestic private in
our sample have 100% private ownership. The average private share for those ﬁrms is 98.8%, with an
average foreign share of around 2%. In our empirical analysis, we checked that our results did not
depend on the ownership cut-off level.
Table A1 in the Appendix also presents themean, standard deviation, andminimumandmaximum
values for each variable within both categories of ﬁrms. Apparently, our dataset covers a wide range of
ﬁrms, primarily SMEs. Indeed, median employment for the entire sample is 144 and 106 for the subset
of private ﬁrms. Comparison with the cutoff for an SME using the EU deﬁnition (250 employees) and
the US deﬁnition (500 employees) clearly points out that our sample is dominated by SMEs. Private
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly smaller, as proxied by total ﬁxed assets and number of employees. However,
they also turn out to be signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable, as measured by the ratio of total proﬁts to total
ﬁxed assets (proﬁts). As a consequence, our empirical analysis will control for size.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Investment equation estimates
Themodel includesdummiesbycityand industry inorder toaccount forunobservable characteristics
at the city and industry level.We also allow for year speciﬁc intercepts.We expect thatmost elements of
ﬁnancial development and institutional reformswill be captured by these dummies. The structure of our
data, however, confronts us with the problem of error clustering. The observable and unobservable
characteristics of the ﬁrmswithin the same city and industry are expected to be correlated (seeMoulton,
1986, 1990). In this paper we correct for clustering via the Froot (1989) correction.We therefore correct
for the correlation of errors between ﬁrms within a speciﬁc city and industry.
Our estimation approach of the impact of the city–industry level FDI on ﬁrm-level investment
should alleviate the potential problem of FDI endogeneity, since it is unlikely that a ﬁrm shock
translates into a change in city–industry level FDI.34 However, sincewewant to ensure that our results
are free from any estimation bias, we also use instrumental variables estimation.35 Due to missing
data, second lags are not available for all right-hand side variables. Besides, those available were often
subject to the weak instrument phenomenon. We decided to use as instruments ﬁrst lags of
regressors36 as well as the square of these ﬁrst lags. Besides, our indicator for interest coverage (COV)
raised speciﬁc problems in terms of instrumentation (cf. infra). Therefore, full speciﬁcation including
COV also relies on two additional instruments, namely interest rate payments and the interaction of
COV with a proﬁtability indicator (the ratio of total proﬁts over sales).
Table 1 reports the results from estimating Eq. (4).37 We distinguish between domestic private
ﬁrms and public ﬁrms. As noted above, a private ﬁrm is deﬁned as one for whichmore than 49% of the
equity is owned by private investors.
34 When the dependent variable is at the ﬁnest level possible, shocks in the error term will be less likely to affect the right-
hand side variables. Moreover, if the explanatory variables are more aggregated, endogeneity is again less likely since shocks to
individual variables affect regional variables only slightly.
35 The 2SLS estimator is a special case of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Verbeek, 2004). Contrary to
work taking ﬁrm-level speciﬁc effects into account, our estimations do not suffer from systematic bias in the lagged dependent
variable, which is traditionally solved by taking a within transformation, and then applying instrumental variables (IV)
estimation or Generalized Method of Moments estimation (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).
36 Note that the ‘‘User cost of Capital’’ does not appear among the tested right-hand side variables. It was systematically
dropped by the IV regressions due to collinearity problems, possibly coming from insufﬁcient variability.
37 Following a referee’s advice, we judge the signiﬁcance at the 1 or 5% level but we leave the 10% threshold in the tables for
information purposes.
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Table 1
Baseline speciﬁcation.
Explained variable Investment over capital (IoverK) t + 1
1 private 2 state-
owned
3 private 4 state-
owned
5 private 6 state-
owned
IoverK 0.34***
(0.05)
0.42***
(0.13)
0.32***
(0.04)
0.42***
(0.13)
0.29***
(0.05)
0.397***
(0.137)
IoverK2 0.03***
(0.01)
0.09***
(0.03)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.09***
(0.03)
0.029**
(0.012)
0.088***
(0.031)
YoverK 0.001***
(0.0001)
0.01***
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.01***
(0.002)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.01***
(0.002)
User cost of capital 0.005
(0.007)
0.001
(0.006)
0.008
(0.007)
0.001
(0.006)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.001
(0.006)
Cash ﬂow 0.001***
(0.0001)
0.03
(0.03)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.03
(0.03)
0.002
(0.004)
0.03
(0.03)
DAR total debt to asset 0.002***
(0.0006)
0.001
(0.005)
0.0018***
(0.0006)
0.001
(0.005)
COV interest coverage 0.0018*
(0.0009)
0.001
(0.0001)
No. of observations 1865 640 1853 635 1732 605
No. of cities and sectors 148 99 148 99 144 95
No. of ﬁrms 1048 353 1042 351 972 337
Dummies Year
Dummies City and sector
R2 0.21 0.39 0.22 0.39 0.11 0.38
Hansen J-stat 3.59 2.49 3.40 3.42 7.37 6.85
p-Value 0.17 0.65 0.18 0.64 0.19 0.23
x2 degrees of freedom 2 4 2 5 5 5
Durbin-Wu–Hausman stat 0.49 1.10 0.58 2.37 3.21 1.16
p-Value 0.78 0.58 0.90 0.50 0.52 0.88
x2 degrees of freedom 2 2 3 3 4 4
Tests for weak identiﬁcation
Cragg-Donald F-stat 14.65 16.66 13.93 12.55 19.06 1.98
Critical value (10%) 8.78 9.48 7.77 9.01 9.37 9.37
Critical value (5%) 13.97 15.72 12.20 15.18 16.10 16.10
F-Stat for weak instruments
YoverK 24.36 92.79 12.11 289.48 259.39 46.19
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat degrees of freedom 3 6 4 8 9 9
Cash ﬂow 5.54 10.00 10.98 9.20 2192.77 10.83
Prob > F 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-Stat degrees of freedom 3 6 4 8 9 9
DAR 2.77 12.65 13695.49 30.41
Prob > F 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-Stat degrees of freedom 4 8 9 9
COV 2.96 2.16
Prob > F 0.004 0.044
F-Stat degrees of freedom 9 9
Froot’s (1989) correction for city–sector cluster correlations. Critical values for the Cragg–Donald test are, respectively, based on
a 10% and 5% 2SLS bias at the 5% signiﬁcance level (see Stock and Yogo (2002)).
* Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Wesystematically check the validity of our instrumentswith heteroskedastic and clustering robust
Hansen’s J-test of overidentifying restrictions. Insigniﬁcant test statistics indicate that the
orthogonality of the instruments and the error terms cannot be rejected, and thus that our choice
of instruments is appropriate.38 In all cases, the overidentifying restrictions are accepted.
Table 1 also provides the ﬁrst-stage cluster-robust F-test (with degrees of freedom corresponding
to the number of regressors in the ﬁrst-stage regression) and the associated p-values of the excluded
instruments for each regressor. We also report the cluster-robust F-stat form of the Cragg–Donald
statistic; this statistic has been suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) as a global test for the presence of
weak instruments (i.e., it tests the null hypothesis that a given group of instruments is weak against
the alternative that it is strong). This statistic is also reported togetherwith the critical values based on
a 5 and 10% maximum bias of the IV estimator relative to the OLS at the 5% conﬁdence level tabulated
by Stock and Yogo (2002). The test rejects if the computed statistic exceeds the critical value. Results of
weak identiﬁcation tests are overall quite satisfactory. Our instruments pass the Cragg–Donald test
comfortably in all cases but column (6), when the full basic speciﬁcation is tested on state-owned
companies. Regarding column (6), the limited number of observations and the difﬁculties for
instrumenting COV seem to be mainly responsible for this situation.39 Overall, most of our ﬁrst-stage
F-statistics are consistently above 10, verifying the Staiger and Stock (1997) ‘‘rule of thumb’’.
The next step is to perform the Durbin-Wu–Hausman test, which tests for the endogeneity of the
market access indicator in a regression estimated with IV.40 Since the heteroskedastic and clustering
robust Durbin-Wu–Hausman test statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of market
access (at the 10% conﬁdence level), we report OLS estimates since they are more efﬁcient than IV
estimates (Pagan, 1984).
We alsowant to ensure that our results are not biased due to there being only fewﬁrms in someof the
city–industryclusters.Theaveragenumberofﬁrmsbycluster is60;weobtainalmost identicalqualitative
and quantitative results if we re-run our estimations excluding clusters with fewer than 30 ﬁrms.
The basic speciﬁcation, reported in columns (1) and (2), does not include debt or interest coverage.
As in Harrison and McMillan (2003), the restrictions imposed by the model are mainly accepted: the
coefﬁcient on lagged investment is positive, the coefﬁcient on squared (lagged) investment is negative
and the coefﬁcient on Y/K is positive. However, the coefﬁcient on cash ﬂow is negative (and highly
signiﬁcant) only for private companies, meaning that higher cash ﬂow today incites companies to
substitute investment tomorrow for investment today. Conversely, public companies’ investment is
not affected by the level of cash ﬂow. This is a ﬁrst hint that private and public companies do not take
their investment decisions the sameway. Columns (3) through (6) of Table 1 add successively our two
proxies for credit constraints, the total debt-to-assets ratio (DAR) and interest coverage (COV). The
coefﬁcient on DAR is signiﬁcant and positive for private companies, as is our proxy for the user cost of
capital, U. The coefﬁcient on COV is also positive but not signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However, all of
these coefﬁcients are close to zero and insigniﬁcant for public companies. Private companies are
therefore credit constrained and care about the cost of funds, while public companies are not affected
by any of these problems. It is useful to interpret the size of the estimated coefﬁcients. Holding other
factors constant, a one standard deviation increase inDAR raises the future investment rate by about 4
percentage points on average. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in COV raises the future
investment rate by 1 percentage point. Since the average investment rate over our sample is 20%, these
impacts are not economically insigniﬁcant.
In a second step, we want to check if our results on credit constraints are related to ﬁrm
characteristics. We start by controlling for the size of the ﬁrm in Table 2, using the value of total ﬁxed
38 Under the joint null hypothesis that instruments are valid instruments and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation, the test statistic is distributed as x2 in the number of other identifying restrictions.
Signiﬁcance is judged at the 10% level.
39 We believe this problem is quite secondary, since one does not see why this speciﬁc estimation based on state-owned
companies subsample should be more concerned by endogeneity problems than the others.
40 The rejection of the null hypothesis (at the 10% conﬁdence level) that the OLS estimator of the same equation yields
consistent estimatesmeans that endogenous regressors have a statistically relevant effect on coefﬁcients, so thatwe should rely
on the IV estimates. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed asx2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of regressors tested.
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Table 2
Investigation of size dependency.
Explained variable Investment over capital (IoverK) t + 1
1 private 2 state-owned 3 private 4 state-owned 5 private 6 state-owned
IoverK 0.28*** (0.04) 0.39*** (0.13) 0.31*** (0.04) 0.42*** (0.12) 0.28*** (0.04) 0.39*** (0.13)
IoverK2 0.03** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.03)
YoverK 0.0015 (0.0014) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.001*** (0.0001) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.010*** (0.002)
User cost of capital 0.02** (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.02** (0.007) 0.001 (0.006)
Cash ﬂow 0.002 (0.004) 0.029 (0.028) 0.001*** (0.0001) 0.028 (0.026) 0.001 (0.004) 0.029 (0.027)
DAR total debt to asset 0.0017*** (0.0006) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002*** (0.0001) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002*** (0.0001) 0.001 (0.004)
DAR interacted with ﬁxed assetsa 0.356** (0.174) 0.145** (0.067) 0.281* (0.152) 0.156 (0.096)
COV interest coverage 0.0018** (0.0009) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
COV interacted with ﬁxed assetsa 0.094 (0.074) 0.006 (0.048)
Fixed assetsa 0.084 (0.062) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.056) 0.022* (0.012) 0.032 (0.051) 0.022 (0.012)
No. of observations 1732 605 1853 635 1732 605
Dummies Year
Dummies City and sector
No. of city and sectors 144 95 148 99 144 95
No. of ﬁrms 972 337 1042 351 972 337
R2 0.11 0.39 0.22 0.39 0.10 0.38
Froot’s (1989) correction for city–sector cluster correlations.
a Indicates that coefﬁcients and standard errors are multiplied by 107.
* Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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assets as a proxy measure. Our prior is that credit constraints decrease with the value of ﬁxed assets
(ﬁrm size). In a world of imperfect ﬁnancial markets with information asymmetries, a larger ﬁrmwill
have easier access to credit since it has more collateral. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 simply add the
value of total ﬁxed assets to the model with DAR and COV. The coefﬁcient on total ﬁxed assets has the
expected negative sign (i.e., greater ﬁxed assets increase investment today and consequently decrease
investment tomorrow), but it is not signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients on the other variables are almost
identical to those presented in Table 1. We subsequently check for a direct impact of size on credit
constraints by adding two interactions: DAR and COV interacted with total ﬁxed assets. The results are
presented in columns (3) through (6) of Table 2. For private companies, while the coefﬁcients on U,
DAR and COV remain positive and signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcients on the two interactions are both
negative, so that larger ﬁrms are less affected by credit constraints. More importantly, even though
private ﬁrms with more ﬁxed assets are less credit constrained, the two ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial distress
indicators remain positive and signiﬁcant.
Conversely, there is no impact of size or credit constraints for public companies, except for a
counter-intuitive positive – but not signiﬁcant at the 5% level – coefﬁcient on total ﬁxed assets
(column (4)). Overall, the evidence of a size effect is not overwhelming. As a robustness check, we rely
on the number of employees as an alternative proxy for size.41 Results (available upon request) are
virtually unchanged.
Last, we also test for possible reputation effects by introducing the age of ﬁrms in a similar way,
ﬁrst adding age alone, and then including interactions.42 Our intuition is that younger ﬁrms may be
more credit constrained, since they must prove their viability by obtaining and keeping market share,
and generally have a greater probability of bankruptcy. However, we did not ﬁnd any evidence of such
effects either for private or public companies.
5.2. Testing for the impact of FDI
One of the key questions addressed in this paper is whether FDI eases or exacerbates domestic
ﬁrms’ credit constraints. We test for a differential impact of ownership in Table 3. These show
equations which include two additional interaction terms, COV times FDI and DAR times FDI, with FDI
being scaled by sales (Eq. (6)) in columns (3) and (4) or by debt in columns (5) and (6).
Both speciﬁcations suggest that FDI eases Chinese private ﬁrms’ credit constraints, as compared to
estimates from the speciﬁcation including only COV and DAR, reproduced in columns (1) and (2). The
coefﬁcient on DAR is slightly smaller in magnitude and less signiﬁcant than that on COV. More
ambiguous evidence is obtained for the user cost of capital U, which is close to zero and insigniﬁcant
for the speciﬁcation using the share of foreign sales but remains positive and signiﬁcant for that
including the share of foreign debt. The coefﬁcients on COV  Share Foreign Sales and COV  Share
Foreign Debt, which are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 and 5% level, respectively, for private ﬁrms,
suggest that the presence of foreign ﬁrms reduces credit constraints. However, no convincing evidence
of crowding-out is found. The coefﬁcients on the share of foreign debt and the share of foreign sales are
positive but insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. These ﬁndings are in line with those of Harrison et al. (2004)
from a cross-country ﬁrm-level panel which showed that global ﬂows are associated with a reduction
in ﬁrm-level ﬁnancing constraints. However, they contrast with the results in Harrison and McMillan
(2003) on Ivory Coast data, where the presence of foreign ﬁrms crowds local ﬁrms out of domestic
capital markets. These diverging results highlight differences in ﬁnancial sector organization and
practice: the scope of crowding out is much more limited in China because of the lack of incentives of
most banks to lend to non-state-owned companies. Our results regarding private ﬁrms contrast
strongly with those on public ﬁrms. We again ﬁnd that public ﬁrms’ investment decisions are not
affected by debt ratios or the cost of debt. Nor is there any evidence that public ﬁrms are affected by
the presence of foreign ﬁrms. We interpret this as evidence in support of the notion of a soft budget
constraint for public ﬁrms (Qian and Roland, 1998).
41 The use of total ﬁxed assets as a proxy for size runs the risk of conﬂating size effects with collateralizability (or similar)
effects. Results using log(employment) show that this is actually not the case.
42 The results are not reported here in order to save space, but are available on request from the authors.
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Table 3
Investigation of FDI impact (scaled by sales (columns (3) and (4)) or debt (columns (5) and (6))).
Explained variable Investment over capital (IoverK) t + 1
1 private 2 state-owned 3 private 4 state-owned 5 private 6 state-owned
IoverK 0.28*** (0.04) 0.39*** (0.13) 0.28*** (0.05) 0.39***(0.14) 0.28*** (0.04) 0.39*** (0.14)
IoverK2 0.03** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.03)
YoverK 0.001 (0.001) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.02** (0.007) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.01*** (0.002)
User cost of capital 0.016** (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.006) 0.02** (0.007) 0.001 (0.006)
Cash ﬂow 0.002 (0.004) 0.03 (0.03) 0.002 (0.004) 0.03 (0.03) 0.002 (0.004) 0.03 (0.03)
COV interest coverage 0.0018* (0.0009) 0.001 (0.001) 0.0025* (0.0013) 0.001 (0.002) 0.0023** (0.0011) 0.01 (0.01)
COV interacted with share of foreign sales 0.034*** (0.012) 0.001 (0.003)
COV interacted with share of foreign debt 0.033** (0.015) 0.01 (0.01)
DAR total debt to asset 0.0018*** (0.00056) 0.001 (0.005) 0.0016* (0.0008) 0.002 (0.006) 0.0017* (0.0009) 0.01 (0.01)
DAR interacted with share of foreign sales 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.02)
DAR interacted with share of foreign debt 0.001(0.002) 0.01 (0.03)
Share of foreign sales over total sales 0.19* (0.10) 0.12 (0.27)
Share of foreign debt over total debt 0.20(0.17) 0.40 (1.04)
No. of observations 1732 605 1732 605 1532 605
Dummies Year
Dummies City and sector
No. of city and sectors 144 95 144 95 144 95
No. of ﬁrms 972 337 972 337 972 337
R2 0.11 0.39 0.10 0.37 0.11 0.37
Froot’s (1989) correction for city–sector cluster correlations.
* Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Table 4
Robustness checks (1) FDI scaled by sales. Private ﬁrms subsample.
Explained variable Investment over capital (IoverK) t + 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
IoverK 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29***
IoverK2 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**
YoverK 0.00014 0.00014 0.00015 0.00014 0.00013 0.00014
User cost of capital 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016**
Cash ﬂow 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
COV interest coverage 0.0025* (0.0013) 0.0023* (0.0012) 0.0032*** (0.0012) 0.0027* (0.0016) 0.0046** (0.0023) 0.0026* (0.0013)
COV interacted with share of foreign sales 0.034*** (0.012) 0.036*** (0.012) 0.035*** (0.012) 0.033** (0.013) 0.028** (0.013) 0.028* (0.017)
DAR total debt to asset 0.0016* (0.0008) 0.0016* (0.0009) 0.0013* (0.0008) 0.0019* (0.0011) 0.0018* (0.0097) 0.0017* (0.0009)
DAR interacted with share of foreign sales 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006)
Share of foreign debt over total sales 0.18* (0.10) 0.18* (0.10) 0.164 (0.11) 0.194** (0.094) 0.16 (0.10) 0.17* (0.10)
COV interacted with proﬁtability 0.003** (0.0015) 0.004 (0.003)
DAR interacted with proﬁtability 0.01 (0.01) 0.0017 (0.0011)
Proﬁtability 0.01 (0.01) 0.0045** (0.0019)
COV interacted with labor intensity 0.01 (0.01)
DAR interacted with labor intensity 0.01 (0.01)
Labor intensity 0.01 (0.01)
COV interacted with innovation 0.01 (0.01)
DAR interacted with innovation 0.01 (0.01)
Innovation 0.01 (0.01)
COV interacted with outward orientation 0.015 (0.021)
DAR interacted with outward orientation 0.007 (0.009)
Outward orientation 0.08 (0.65)
No. of observations 1732 1732 1732 1732 1667 1732
Dummies Year
Dummies City and sector
No. of city and sectors 144 144 144 135 144 144
No. of ﬁrms 972 972 972 972 945 972
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Froot’s (1989) correction for city–sector cluster correlations.
* Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Table 5
Robustness checks (2) FDI scaled by debt. Private ﬁrms subsample.
Explained variable Investment over capital (IoverK) t + 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
IoverK 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29***
IoverK2 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
YoverK 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
User cost of capital 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Cash ﬂow 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002
COV interest coverage 0.0023** (0.0011) 0.002* (0.0010) 0.0027*** (0.0010) 0.0028* (0.0016) 0.0045* (0.0023) 0.0024** (0.0012)
COV interacted with share of foreign debt 0.033** (0.0146) 0.036** (0.0143) 0.034** (0.0145) 0.033** (0.0144) 0.025* (0.0149) 0.024 (0.016)
DAR total debt to asset 0.0017* (0.0009) 0.0017* (0.0009) 0.0013* (0.0008) 0.0029* (0.0011) 0.0019* (0.0009) 0.0017* (0.0009)
DAR interacted with share of foreign debt 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Share of foreign debt over total debt 0.21 (0.17) 0.21 (0.17) 0.21 (0.17) 0.22 (0.16) 0.18 (0.17) 0.17 (0.18)
COV interacted with proﬁtability 0.003** (0.0013) 0.003 (0.003)
DAR interacted with proﬁtability 0.001 (0.001) 0.0018* (0.0010)
Proﬁtability 0.001 (0.001) 0.00461** (0.0018)
COV interacted with labor intensity 0.0007 (0.0007)
DAR interacted with labor intensity 0.00019 (0.00013)
Labor intensity 0.006 (0.004)
COV interacted with innovation 0.0003 (0.0002)
DAR interacted with innovation 0.000069* (0.000035)
Innovation 0.0011 (0.0023)
COV interacted with outward orientation 0.024 (0.019)
DAR interacted with outward orientation 0.007 (0.012)
Outward Orientation 0.05 (0.66)
No. of observations 1732 1732 1732 1732 1667 1732
Dummies Year
Dummies City and sector
No. of city and sectors 144 144 144 144 135 144
No. of ﬁrms 972 972 972 972 945 972
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Froot’s (1989) correction for city–sector cluster correlations.
* Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Based on results from column (5), we can compute the impact of a one standard deviation increase
in foreign presence (corresponding roughly to a doubling of the share of foreign sales or debt), holding
other factors constant.We ﬁnd that it would have a relatively limited impact since it would reduce the
future investment rate by about half a percentage point on average.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results using a dummy variable for the share of foreign sales
(or the share of foreign debt) being greater than the yearlymedian among the different industries. The
results (available upon request) are very similar in terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance.
5.3. Robustness checks
One potential criticism of our approach is that the impact of FDI shown above may reﬂect omitted
variables. Apart from capital, FDI may bring additional beneﬁts (such as innovation and new
management techniques). Moreover, FDI may ﬂow to sectors which display certain characteristics.
Typically, greater FDI is found in sectors with higher proﬁtability, labor intensity and outward
orientation. We would then want to check whether the relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints actually
results from one of these factors, instead of FDI. We therefore carried out additional regressions,
including new variables measuring proﬁtability, labor intensity, productive innovation and export-
orientation, and their interactions with our proxies for ﬁnancial constraints.
The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4, FDI is scaled by sales while in Table 5 it is scaled
by debt. Columns (1) and (2) test to see whether the correlation between credit constraints and the
foreign sector share for private ﬁrms comes from higher proﬁtability. The latter is deﬁned as the ratio
of operating proﬁts (1) or business proﬁts (2) to sales. Column (3) addresses the same concerns, but
with respect to labor intensity, deﬁned as the number of employees over ﬁxed investment. Column (4)
introduces the interaction between credit constraints and the share of new products in exports. Last,
column (5) tests for an effect via export orientation, measured as the value of exports over total sales.
As for the FDI indicators, these variables are computed as averages by industry and city in order to
alleviate potential endogeneity problems. Were foreign investment to be simply a proxy for these
variables, the relaxing of credit constraints emphasized in the previous section should disappear.
Conversely, if foreign investment really does alleviate credit constraints, the negative interactions
with credit constraint proxies should remain statistically signiﬁcant. The results strongly suggest that
this is the case.
The introduction of interactions between credit constraints (COV and DAR) and the variables for
proﬁtability, labor intensity, share of new products in exports or outward orientation leaves the
results basically unchanged. Only one interaction (COV interacted with proﬁtability) is negative and
signiﬁcant, providing some evidence that proﬁtable practices help to alleviate credit constraints for
private ﬁrms in China. However, these additional controls do not affect the main ﬁnding of negative
and signiﬁcant interactions between FDI and credit constraints as proxied by COV.
6. Conclusion
Using ﬁrm-level panel data across Chinese cities, we estimate a dynamic investment model to
study the presence of ﬁnancing constraints for Chinese domestic ﬁrms. Our results shed light on the
impact of ongoing ﬁnancial sector reforms designed to improve the efﬁciency of capital allocation.
They suggest a striking difference between the credit constraints faced by domestic private and state-
owned ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that our two ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial distress (debt-to-asset ratios and
interest coverage) do signiﬁcantly affect investment for domestic private ﬁrms, suggesting that they
are credit constrained. On the other hand, investment by state-owned ﬁrms is not signiﬁcantly related
to these indicators. Nor is there any evidence that this latter is signiﬁcantly correlated with FDI
inﬂows.
However, the results suggest that FDI inﬂows are associated with a modest reduction in ﬁnancing
constraints for private domestic ﬁrms. FDI inﬂows do seem to reduce the imperfections faced by
private domestic ﬁrms when dealing with ﬁnancial markets. We thus ﬁnd support for the general
argument that the development of cross-border relationships with foreign ﬁrms helps private
domestic ﬁrms to bypass both the ﬁnancial and legal obstacles that they face at home (Huang, 2003).
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Our ﬁndings are moreover consistent with those in the literature that consider a role for demand in
addition to the traditional supply-side perspective in explaining themassive amount of inward foreign
investment in China. FDI to Chinese provinces is not only the consequence of good policies, but also
results from distortions in the banking market and in state investment policies (Havrylchyk and
Poncet, 2007).
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